Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 US 537 (1896).
In an era when "social Darwinism" was fashionable, this racist Court found that a Louisiana statute which separated the races on trains where the fares, the cars, the time of travel, and all the other tangibles could be shown as equal, did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. So long as the facilities were equal, they could be separate. Hence the standard: "separate but equal." Vote was 7-1. Notable dissent by Justice Harlan which argued that "our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."

Schenck v. United States, 249 US 47 (1919).
The Court has always been reluctant to obstruct the power of the political branches to defend the country in time of war. Here it held that the distribution of leaflets advising men not to submit to the World War I military draft was punishable under the Espionage Act of 1917. The Court ruled that the Act did not violate the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech and press because there were some circumstances in which speech or press which could be prohibited. Justice Holmes wrote for the Court, for example, that speech which caused a "clear and present danger," such as falsely crying "Fire!" in a crowded theater was not protected, and he wrote that Schenck's leaflets created such a "clear and present danger," too. Of course, they did not, but it was wartime. Decision was unanimous.

Near v. Minnesota, 283 US 697 (1931).
The Minnesota statute that allowed abatement as a penalty for malicious or scandalous publication of newspapers and magazines was ruled unconstitutional here. The Court held that there were other remedies against newsmen who abused their free press rights, but that the First Amendment guarantee of a free press meant nothing unless it meant that there could be no "prior restraint," or governmental censorship before publication. Here, since the press could be shut down, future editions would be restrained before publication, and that could not be permittted under the freedom of the press clause of the First Amendment, which was applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. Vote was 5-4.

Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 US 337 (1938).
The Court upheld its "separate but equal" doctrine from Plessy by insisting that the State did not satisfy its obligation to provide "equal protection" merely by providing a tuition grant for a black man to go to law school out of state. The practice of law, the Court reasoned, was rooted in an understanding of the specific laws of an individual state--where an aspiring lawyer must pass the bar exam--and in a network of contacts with other lawyers, judges, etc. that one could not nurture outside the state. In the absence of an all-black law school in Missouri, therefore, the State would have to admit Gaines to the University of Missouri, hitherto all-white. Vote was 7-2.

Smith v. Allwright, 321 US 649 (1944).
Here, the State of Texas had been before the Supreme Court in a series of cases wherein it tried to defend the Democratic Party's all-white primary voting rules. The Court rejected several schemes in cases in the 1920s, but finally accepted one in Grovey v. Townsend in 1935, when the State had divorced itself sufficiently from the Democratic Party so that the Court ruled that the Fifteenth Amendment was not applicable. But in 1944, perhaps under the influence of the war against anti-Semitic Nazi Germany, the Court chose to find that since the Democratic Party was the only party of any consequence in Texas, to deprive a black citizen of the right to vote in the party's primary solely on the basis of his race was to violate the Fifteenth Amendment. Vote was 8-1.

Korematsu v. U.S., 323 US 214 (1944).
Although the Court nearly apologized for doing so, it upheld a general's order, a Presidential proclamation, and a Congressional statute that forced American citizens of Japanese ancestry to leave their homes on the West Coast during the emergency faced by the United States in the early days of World War II when the experts feared that Japan was really going to invade California. The Court ruled that doing so was a permissable use of the war powers, I, 8:11-15, saying that the "power to wage war is the power to wage it successfully," and leaving the general, the President, and the Congress that much leeway. Vote was 6-3.

Morgan v. Virginia, 328 US 373 (1946).
Here the Court invalidated Virginia's segregation system as far as it governed travel on interstate buses. It ruled that even though Ms. Morgan did not leave Virginia before she was arrested, asking her and all other passengers to move fore and aft each time the racial make-up of the group of passengers changed imposed an impermissible burden on interstate commerce, an area reserved to Congress alone, I,8:3. The Court did not deal with the Plessy doctrine, which of course directly concerned public transportation as did this case. But its ruling heartened the opponents of segregation, since the Court seemed to be reaching for ways to desegregate the society. Vote was 7-1.

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, 347 US 487 (1954).
In one of the great masterpieces of judicial politics, Chief Justice Warren got a unanimous vote on this one, overturning the "separate but equal" doctrine as it applied to public schools. "In the field of public education," he wrote in a ringing phrase, "separate is inherently unequal," and therefore a violation of the equal protection clause of Am XIV. Although the Topeka School Board had done an apparently conscientious job of providing equal schools for the African-American children, NAACP lawyer Thurgood Marshall was able to produce a Brandeis brief showing that black kids in segregated schools had a disincentive to learn because they knew they would not get a chance in the society that had segregated them even if they became master scholars. The Court agreed, but in the years to come it paid dearly in judicial sovereignty for its lack of restraint.

Yates v. U.S., 354 US 298 (1957).
Here the Warren Court brought the John Birch Society down on its head, by finding a difference between what Yates was doing and what Dennis had been doing in Dennisv. U.S., 341 US 494 (1951). Yates, like Dennis, was a leader of the Communist Party accused of violating the 1940 Smith Act, which prohibited working to overthrow the government by force or violence. There was no difference, of course, in what the two organizers did, but a different Court in this less hysterical era found that Yates was merely "advocating" the overthrow of the U.S. government, not taking "overt action" to accomplish that overthrow. It held that hers was exactly the kind of unpopular speech that the First Amendment was designed to protect. 6-1 decision.

Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476 (1957)
The Court ruled that the First Amendment was intended to protect the free interchange of ideas, even those with the slightest redeeming social importance, but that obscenity was not a protected form of expression. Thus the statutes that made it criminal for Roth to circulate obscene material was not unconstitutional. The "Roth test" was a doctrine that defined obscenity as material which "taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest" in light of "contemporary community standards." Vote was 6-3.

Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 US 339 (1960).
The Court rejected as unconstitutional--a violation of both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fifteenth Amendment's voting guarantee--a gerrymander by the city government of Tuskegee, Alabama, that had the effect of excluding from the city almost all the black people and leaving within it all the whites. The Court tested only the intention of the city, which it ruled was apparent on the face of the law. Although it didn't say so, the Court must have seen that the idea was to keep the schools segregated. The decision was unanimous.

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US 643 (1961).
The Court ruled in Mapp that the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures was applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In doing so, it adopted the "exclusionary rule," which meant that evidence that was procured illegally could not be used against a criminal defendant. This is sometimes called the doctrine of the "fruit of the poisoned tree." For that reason, Mapp's conviction, based on evidence found in a search that violated the Fourth Amendment, could not be upheld. The vote was 6-3.

Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186 (1962).
Here the Court specifically reversed its decision in Colgrove, ruling that where it was shown that the state legislature for a long time did not carry out its responsibility under I,4:1 to reapportion the voting districts, and Congress under the same clause did not force the state legislature to do so, the Court could and would intervene under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause to guarantee "one [hu]man, one vote." Its 6-2 decision shattered the idea that there were political questions outside the Court's jurisdiction.

Engel v. Vitale, 370 US 421 (1962).
The Court ruled that when the New York State Board of Regents wrote a prayer for the public schools, it had crossed the boundary that separated church and state under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. In a 6-1 decision, the Court ruled that of course state and church would mingle from time to time, but permissible mingling if the policy:
(1) must have a secular purpose--as this one did not;
(2) must neither advance nor inhibit religion--as this one did on both counts;
(3) must not foster an excessive governmental entanglement with religion--as this one did.

Gideon v. Wainwright, 373 US 335 (1963).
Here the Court overruled its own 1942 holding in Betts v. Brady, and instead adopted the standard long followed in federal courts. It held that the Sixth Amendment means that not only must a defendant have a right to a lawyer, but he must actually have a lawyer if he wants one. In all prosecutions where a citizen is in jeopardy of life, liberty, or property, he has a right to a lawyer, and if he is indigent, the state must provide the lawyer for him. While this may seem to violate the common-law "adversary process," in this case it proved wise, since Gideon did not actually commit the crime he was accused of, but only a lawyer could prove his innocence. Decision was 9-0.

N.Y. Times v. Sullivan 376 US 254 (1964).
After a state court ruled that the New York Times Company must pay heavy damages for having published an advertisement signed by prominent civil rights leaders which was filled with inaccurate statements and innuendoes about the oppressiveness of the police in Alabama, the Court handed down its broadest ruling protecting the freedom of the press. Since the ad included a lot of "editorial commentary," the Court ruled that it was protected under the First Amendment. And since Sullivan was a public official, the Police Commissioner, even though his men had not acted so badly as the ad said, he was not allowed to collect damages from the press, also because of the First Amendment protection of the free press. The Court ruled that for a public official to collect on a libel charge, he has to show that the press was "reckless in its disregard" for the truth, or that it demonstrated "actually malice" in its approach to him. Decision was 9-0.

Griffin v. School Board of Prince Edward County, VA, 377 US 218 (1964).
To comply with the Brown decisions, Prince Edward County, Virginia, closed its schools, claiming that that ended segregation in the county. It then offered public funds to any school child, black or white, who wished to go to the private schools that had grown up as a result of the closings, saying that to do so complied with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But the Court ruled that such a policy was simply a dodge, and that the board did not satisfy its obligation by mere "desegregation," but instead had continued the unequal treatment of the black children, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. School boards had to integrate the schools, the Court ruled, not merely desegregate them. Unanimous decision.

Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 US 533 (1964).
Escobedo was questioned twice regarding a murder. During the second investigation, the police told him that they had information that he was the killer. He asked to see his lawyer, but the police wouldn't let him, on the grounds that where the Sixth Amendment says "in all criminal prosecutions" it means only after indictment. The Supreme Court, though, ruled in a 5-4 decision that such a holding would emasculate the "right to counsel," and that instead the Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists from the moment the "focus of suspicion" lands upon a suspect.

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965).
The Court ruled that there was a "penumbra" around the First, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Tenth Amendments that together created a "right to privacy" which allowed married people to decide for themselves whether to employ birth control devices. Consequently it invalidated the state anti-birth control law under which Ms. Griswold had been convicted. Vote was 7-2.

Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 US 413 (1966).
In a 6-3 decision, the Court invalidated the Massachusetts obscenity law on the grounds that it violated the free press and free speech elements of the First Amendment. Here the Court added to the definition of "obscenity" which it had first created in Roth v. U.S. In Roth, the Court said that obscenity was material which "taken as a whole" appealed to the prurient interest. Here it said that for material to be judged obscene, it had to be "utterly without redeeming social value," leaving open a very large door for material to pass through.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966).
When under investigation for kidnapping and rape, Miranda signed a confession that included a waiver of his right to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel. He later recanted, saying he never really understood what he was doing. The Court agreed, holding that unless he had a lawyer with him when he waived his right to counsel, no one could be sure what he understood. Thereafter, to make a conviction stick, police would have to show that they had affirmatively advised a suspect of all his rights, including the right to remain silent, to have an attorney present, to have the state pay for the lawyer if he couldn't afford one, and to terminate an interrogation whenever he wanted it stopped. The Court was building here on Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) and Escobedo v. Illinois(1964), and the majority showed its impatience with the Arizona police in its decision. The vote of the Court was 5-4.

Chimel v. California, 395 US 752 (1969).
This was the very last case ever decided by Chief Justice Earl Warren. In it, the Court clarified the doctrine of "search incidental to arrest." Without a search warrant, the police could search a suspect only under limited circumstances, the Court ruled: namely, to confiscate items that might help the suspect to escape or to injure the police, and to collect evidence of the crime that might be within the suspect's reach to prevent him from destroying it. 7-2 decision.

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 US 1 (1971).
The Court ordered that where there had been de jure dual school systems, it was constitutionally permissible for the District Court (1) to decide whether progress was being made by seeing what the percentages of blacks and whites were in the various schools throughout a school district, and (2) to allow the busing of children to schools farther than their neighborhood school to achieve a better racial mix, when the busing to achieve desegregation was comparable to the busing that had been used to achieve segregation. [Please note how to spell "busing." To spell the word with two S's means "kissing."] The decision was unanimous.

Cohen v. California, 403 US 15 (1971)
In a 5-4 decision, the Court found that the petitioner's wearing a jacket with the words "Fuck The Draft. Stop The War." on the back was a Constitutionally protected form of expression, as it constituted a political idea, which was exactly what the Framers intended to protect: the freedom to dissent.

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 US 602 (1971).
The Court ruled that Pennsylvania's statute that provided funds for the secular parts of the education provided in church schools was an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment. Entanglement between church and state is inevitable in a religious society like America's, the Court ruled. But, recalling Engel, the test is whether (1) the law's purpose is secular, (2) the law neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) the entanglement is not excessive. The Court found that this law violated both the second and third doctrine. Vote was 8-0.

New York Times Company v. U.S., 403 US 713 (1971).
A divided Court (6-3) ruled that the United States could not enjoin the Times from publishing a government study of the Vietnam war, because the material was historical and the government could show no actual threat to national security. The Court confirmed the holding from Near that the First Amendment guarantee of a free press meant there could be no prior restraint, and the majority agreed with the district court that "a cantakerous press, an obstinate press, an ubiquitous press, must be suffered by those in authority in order to preserve the even greater values of freedom of expression and the right of the people to know."

U.S. v. Caldwell, 408 US 205 (1972).
The Court showed what it thought about criminal justice, when it ordered a New York Times reporter to testify in a grand jury investigation, even though to do so would almost certainly dry up his sources. A divided 5-4 Court ruled that the reporter was not privileged--like spouses, clergy, doctors, and lawyers--and that therefore the First Amendment was not so important as society's common-law need to investigate possible crime.

Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113 (1973)
The Court ruled that, by the "penumbras and emanations" cited in Griswold which created the right to privacy, a woman had a right to privacy in her own body that allowed her to make her own decision about abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy, when fetal viability was impossible. The Texas law which prohibited abortions except when the mother’s life was in danger, therefore, was an unconstitutional violation of this right. The Court did rule that during the second trimester the State could regulate the conditions of abortions and that during the third trimester, when the fetus was viable, the State could ban abortions altogether. This decision by Blackmun is not written well, and its loopholes have caused the Court tremendous blacklash, but so far it has withstood all major assaults. The vote was 7-2.

U.S. v. Nixon, 418 US 683 (1974).
The Court agreed that the doctrine of "separation of powers" did give the President a right to "executive privilege," so that he could have private counsel from his advisers. But as in Caldwell, the Court ruled that that privilege ended when the material the President tried to keep private bore on criminal matters. Vote was 8-0.

Milliken v. Bradley, 418 US 717 (1974).
The Court took the position that although Michigan was guilty of de jure segregation by drawing the school district lines the way it did, the Circuit Court's ruling that only a multi-district plan could achieve real integration was not valid because the outlying districts had done nothing to contribute to the segregation.
The Court's ruling ignored the fact that the bus trips of the CCA's plan would be shorter, the number of buses needed would be smaller, and the result would be a mix of blacks and whites in the schools much better than the 70-30 mix the Detroit-only plan would yield. Most observers regard this as a step back from Brown, since whites could now avoid integration simply by moving out of Detroit to suburbs where blacks would probably be restricted by housing custom. 7-2 vote.

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 US 153 (1977)
Here the Court found that the repairs made in the Georgia capital punishment statute after Furman v. Georgia, 408 US 238 (1972), satisfied the Eighth Amendment concerns about "cruel and unusual punishments."
Georgia now had a bifurcated trial. In the sentencing portion and throughout an automatic appeal process, the prosecution would have to show that the crime had been really savage or committed during the commission of another capital felony, that there was no racial or other bias, and that the penalty assessed to this particular crime was like punishments assessed to others like it. 7-2 vote.

Regents v. Bakke, 438 US 265 (1978).
This was a mathematical anomaly, in which a single justice was a one-man majority. The Court held, 5-4, that a state university could consider race in its medical school admissions policies. But the Court then held, 5-4, that the university could not set quotas so that specified numbers of named minorities were the only candidates for some seats. As a guide, it looked favorably on the undergraduate admissions policy at Harvard, not a state university, where minority students were eagerly recruited but no quotas were set. Both sides argued that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause were being violated. The state argued that since it was a government, it had an obligation to see that members of the minorities were becoming doctors in its universities. But Bakke said that the Civil Rights Act protected him, a white, as well as all the blacks. Burger, Rehnquist, White, and Stewart ruled that the university could not consider race and could not set quotas. Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens ruled that it could consider race and could set quotas. Powell ruled that it could consider race but not set quotas, and he won.

Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)
The Court, in a 5-4 decision, ruled that a school board's decision to ban certain books from its junior high and high school libraries, based on their content, violated the First Amendment's freedom of speech protections. Although school boards have a vested interest in promoting respect for social, moral, and political community values, their discretionary power is secondary to the transcendent imperatives of the First Amendment. The majority argued that as centers for voluntary inquiry and the dissemination of information and ideas, school libraries enjoy a special affinity with the rights of free speech and press. Therefore, the Board could not restrict the availability of books in its libraries simply because its members disagreed with their idea content.