

excerpt from
John Locke, *Second Treatise On Government*

**Chapter IX:
Of the Ends of Political Society and Government**

IF man in the state of Nature be so free as has been said, if he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest and subject to nobody, why will he part with his freedom, this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of Nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain and constantly exposed to the invasion of others; for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very insecure. This makes him willing to quit this condition which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers; and it is not without reason that he seeks out and is willing to join in society with others who are already united, or have a mind to unite for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name—property.

The great and chief end, therefore, of men uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property; to which in the state of Nature there are many things wanting.

Firstly, there wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the common measure to decide all controversies between them. For though the law of Nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures, yet men, being biased by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their particular cases.

Secondly, in the state of Nature there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the established law. For every one in that state being both judge and executioner of the law of Nature, men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much heat in their own cases, as well as negligence and unconcernedness, make them too remiss in other men's.

Thirdly, in the state of Nature there often wants power to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution. They who by any injustice offended will seldom fail where they are able by force to make good their injustice. Such resistance many times makes the punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive to those who attempt it.

Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the state of Nature, being but in an ill condition while they remain in it are quickly driven into society. Hence it comes to pass, that we seldom find any number of men live any time together in this state. The inconveniencies that they are therein exposed to by the irregular and uncertain exercise of the power every man has of punishing the transgressions of others, make them take sanctuary under the established laws of government, and therein seek the preservation of their property. It is this that makes them so willingly give up every one his single power of

40 punishing to be exercised by such alone as shall be appointed to it amongst them, and by
such rules as the community, or those authorized by them to that purpose, shall agree on.
And in this we have the original right and rise of both the legislative and executive power
as well as of the governments and societies themselves.

45 For in the state of Nature to omit the liberty he has of innocent delights, a man has two
powers. The first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself and others
within the permission of the law of Nature; by which law, common to them all, he and all
the rest of mankind are one community, make up one society distinct from all other
creatures, and were it not for the corruption and viciousness of degenerate men, there would
be no need of any other, no necessity that men should separate from this great and natural
50 community, and associate into lesser combinations. The other power a man has in the state
of Nature is the power to punish the crimes committed against that law. Both these he gives
up when he joins in a private, if I may so call it, or particular political society, and
incorporates into any commonwealth separate from the rest of mankind.

55 The first power— viz., of doing whatsoever he thought fit for the preservation of himself
and the rest of mankind, he gives up to be regulated by laws made by the society, so far
forth as the preservation of himself and the rest of that society shall require; which laws of
the society in many things confine the liberty he had by the law of Nature.

Secondly, the power of punishing he wholly gives up, and engages his natural force,
which he might before employ in the execution of the law of Nature, by his own single
60 authority, as he thought fit, to assist the executive power of the society as the law thereof
shall require. For being now in a new state, wherein he is to enjoy many conveniences
from the labor, assistance, and society of others in the same community, as well as
protection from its whole strength, he is to part also with as much of his natural liberty, in
providing for himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety of the society shall require, which
65 is not only necessary but just, since the other members of the society do the like.

But though men when they enter into society give up the equality, liberty, and
executive power they had in the state of Nature into the hands of the society, to be so far
disposed of by the legislative as the good of the society shall require, yet it being only with
an intention in every one the better to preserve himself, his liberty and property (for no
70 rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse),
the power of the society or legislative constituted by them can never be supposed to
extend farther than the common good, but is obliged to secure every one's property by
providing against those three defects above mentioned that made the state of Nature so
unsafe and uneasy. And so, whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any
75 commonwealth, is bound to govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known
to the people, and not by extemporary decrees, by indifferent and upright judges, who are
to decide controversies by those laws; and to employ the force of the community at home
only in the execution of such laws, or abroad to prevent or redress foreign injuries and
secure the community from inroads and invasion. And all this to be directed to no other
80 end but the peace, safety, and public good of the people.

